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Campaign Finance Reform in North Carolina: An Act to Limit
Campaign Expenditures and to Strengthen Public
Financing of Political Campaigns1
Candidates for public office have engaged in controversial campaign practices, in particular the spending of money to influence voters, since the days of
George Washington. 2 This early link between expenditures and pursuit of public office has remained a constant in American politics, with greater amounts
being spent each year in federal and state elections. 3 The trend has reached
North Carolina, where the state's gubernatorial candidates in the 1988 election
together spent close to $10 million during the 4campaign, making it by far the
most expensive race in North Carolina history.
In an effort to curb these extraordinary expenditures and to prevent less
wealthy candidates from being precluded from participating in the electoral process, the North Carolina General Assembly ratified Chapter 1063, An Act To
Limit Campaign Expenditures And To Strengthen Public Financing Of Political
Campaigns. 5 The Act, which will become effective January 1, 1992,6 establishes
a publicly-financed campaign fund for candidates for the offices of Governor and
Council
of State, 7 and sets spending limits for those who choose to use the public
8
funds.
With this new statute, North Carolina expands significantly upon its existing legislation in the area of campaign reform. 9 Campaign reform measures
1. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-278.46 to -278.57) [hereinafter Campaign Expenditure Act].
2. Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment-All the
FreeSpeech Money Can Buy, 39 OKLA. L. REv. 729, 729 (1986). George Washington, for example,
while seeking a seat in the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1767, distributed approximately 160 gallons of liquor to the 391 voters in his district. This averages more than a quart and a half of liquor
per eligible voter. Id.
3. For example, the total amount spent by the Republican and Democratic candidates in the
1860 presidential election was $150,000. In 1980 the presidential candidates' combined expenditures
exceeded $58 million. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 7 (3d ed. 1984).

4. Durham Sun, Nov. 1, 1988, at A3, col. 1. This figure represented a dramatic increase over
the expenditures by the two candidates in the 1984 gubernatorial campaign, which totaled $7.6
million. Id.
5. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-278.46 to -278.57).
6. Id. § 5 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.45). Although funds will begin to be
collected via a special provision on the 1988 state tax return forms, actual distribution of funds
collected will not take place until the elections beginning in 1992. Id.
7. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 466 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.47). The Council of State includes the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of
State, Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Commissioner of
Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, and the Commissioner of Insurance. See N.C. GEN STAT.
§ 147-3 (1987).
8. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1988 Sess. Laws 467 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.48). Currently, it is constitutional to place expenditure limits only on those accepting
public funding for campaigns. The Constitution does not place limits on candidates not using public
funds. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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range from disclosure requirements and contribution and expenditure limitations to public financing for candidates. They have been enacted to different
extents by all fifty states and the federal government.' 0 The goals of these reform efforts, which will be discussed more fully later in this Note," are basically
to reduce the potential for corruption of candidates, eliminate the advantage that
wealthy candidates have over less wealthy opponents, increase political participation at all levels, and improve the quality of the electoral process by changing
campaigning from personal media contests to competitions of ideas.12
Despite these worthy objectives, campaign reform legislation, particularly
those enactments that restrict campaign contributions and expenditures, raises
important constitutional concerns and is reviewed with strict scrutiny by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo,1 3 the leading case
in the area of campaign finance reform, recognized that "[d]iscussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our Constitution."' 14 Such discussion was necessary, the Court reasoned, because "the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities
of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation." 15 Given its importance, political debate and discussion deserve the
most stringent first amendment protection. 16 Attempts by reformers to regulate
the financial aspects of political campaigning can intrude upon this "area of the
most fundamental First Amendment activities" 17 in two ways. First, campaign
funding bears a direct relation to the amount of speech in which a candidate can
engage. Reform measures that attempt to regulate or restrict campaign financing can impinge on the freedom of political speech to the extent that they
"reduc[e] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."' 8
Second, reform efforts can impede "protected associational freedoms" since
"[m]aking a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person
with a candidate."' 19 In light of these constitutional concerns, the Supreme
Court has refused to uphold campaign finance reform statutes absent a showing
of a "compelling state interest" to justify the burdens placed on first amendment
10. For a discussion of the different campaign reform techniques employed by the states, see
ihfra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.

12. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 741-46 (discussing objectives of campaign finance
reform).
13. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 14-15.
16. Id. at 14; see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("it can hardly be
doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of... [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs .... of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates").
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 22.
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freedoms. 20
This Note briefly examines the history of federal and state campaign reform
in the United States, evaluates the approach adopted by the North Carolina
General Assembly for dealing with campaign finance problems, and analyzes the
current state of the law in this area. The Note concludes that the new North
Carolina statute marks a significant step toward democratizing the state electoral process and reducing the potential for undue influence when candidates rely
solely on private contributions to finance their campaigns. The Note also observes that although further reform may be necessary to combat remaining
problems in the campaign process, future efforts must be preceded by careful
study in order to document the compelling state interests necessary to justify
additional reform.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE NEW NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE

North Carolina's new Campaign Expenditure Act21 supplements existing

state legislation that requires disclosure of campaign finances and imposes ceilings on campaign contributions. 22 The new statute is significant because it
marks the state's first attempt to provide public funding directly to candidates
for political office. Funds will be collected on a voluntary'basis from taxpayers
to whom the state owes income tax refunds. 23 Any contributions made in this
manner will qualify as tax deductions under state law. 24
Actual distribution of the monies to candidates will first take place during
the 1992 election year.2 5 Funds will be distributed to eligible candidates for the
20. See, eg., id. at 55 (campaign expenditure ceilings imposed on all candidates declared invalid
because of insufficient governmental interest justifying such restrictions); id. at 26, 29 (limits on size
of private campaign contributions upheld because of important state interest in eliminating corruption and appearance of corruption); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F.
Supp. 280, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y.) (expenditure limits placed on candidates accepting public funding
declared valid because justified by compelling interests in increasing competitive debate of issues and
reducing corruptive influence of large contributions), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). One commentator has questioned whether Buckley and subsequent cases dealing with campaign finance reform have consistently applied strict scrutiny as the standard of review. Nicholson, Political
Campaign Expenditure Limitations and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS
CON T. L.Q. 601, 607-12 (1983). The Buckley Court, however, early in its opinion, refused to treat
the campaign finance regulation issue as it would a symbolic speech case and implicitly rejected the
argument that a lesser standard of review should be applied. Id. at 607 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at
16-17). Moreover, given the particularly important first amendment interest implicated by this type
of legislation, see supra text acompanying notes 13-19, strict scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of review. On this point the Buckley Court stated clearly that "exacting scrutiny [is] applicable
to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.
21. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-278.46 to -278.57).
22. See infra notes 80-83 and acompanying text.
23. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 2, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 470 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-163.16(f)). State income tax return forms, beginning with the taxable year 1988,
will include a new provision enabling these taxpayers to designate that either all or part of their
refund be paid into a new candidates financing fund. Id. § 5, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 471.
24. Id. § 2, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 470 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-163.16(f)).
Taxpayers cannot earmark their contributions for a particular candidate, however.
25. Id. § 5, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 471 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.45).
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offices of Governor and Council of State2 6 on a one-to-one basis matching each
dollar of private contributions received by the candidate. 27 As a condition to
accepting these public funds, candidates must agree to use these funds only for
campaign expenditures, 2 8 to abide by established total campaign expenditure
limits, and to submit to a postelection audit of their campaign accounts. 29 Candidates accepting public financing who violate any of the provisions of the new

statute are subject to civil and criminal penalties. 30
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL AND STATE CAMPAIGN REFORM

A. FederalLegislation
For a hundred years after the Civil War, Congress attempted to regulate
campaign financing with a variety of legislation. 3' These early federal efforts
culminated with the passage of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of
197132 and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197133 and its important 1974
amendments. 34 The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act established a
26. Id. § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 466-67 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163278.47(a)).
27. Id., § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 467 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.50(b)).
28. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.49).
29. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.47(c)(1), (c)(3)).
30. Id., § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 469 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.52 to 278.53).
31. One of the first congressional attempts to regulate campaign financing was the Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, which made it illegal for government employees to solicit contributions for
"political purposes" from workers in the nation's navy yards. Ch. 172, § 3, 14 Stat. 489, 492 (1867).
This measure was later bolstered by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, which prohibited federal
employees from soliciting or receiving political contributions from other federal employees. Ch. 27,
§ 11, 22 Stat. 403, 406 (1883). A more significant development occurred in 1907 during Theodore
Roosevelt's administration with the passage of the Tillman Act. Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)). Underlying the Act's passage was congressional recognition
of the potential for influence peddling by corporations with large amounts of money to contribute to
political candidates. The Tillman Act was designed to eliminate this problem by barring corporations from making any contributions to election campaigns. Id. The War Labor Disputes Act of
1943 later prohibited labor organizations from making contributions in connection with any federal
election. Ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943), repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94283, § 201, 90 Stat. 459, 496 (1976) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)). Another major
legislative enactment was the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070,
repealed by Act of February 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1972), which required
detailed disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures by candidates for Congress and imposed ceilings on campaign spending. Id. §§ 305, 309. Unless the laws of the candidate's state
provided otherwise, aggregate expenditure limits per campaign for Senators and Representatives
were $10,000 and $2,500 respectively. Id. § 309(b)(1). The purpose of disclosure requirements is to
inform the public about the monetary influences on the candidates, thereby reducing the likelihood
that candidates will exchange political favors for large private contributions. See H. ALEXANDER,
supra note 3, at 19. Campaign spending ceilings are, among other things, designed to prevent great
disparities in spending between candidates. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1976). In 1939
Congress passed the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), which was amended in 1940 to limit to
$5,000 the aggregate amount of contributions an individual could make in one calendar year to a
single candidate for federal office. Ch. 640, § 13(a), 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)(A) (1982)).
32. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13
(1982)).
33. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-56 (1982)).
34. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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system of public funding for presidential election campaigns. 35 The Federal

Election Campaign Act (FECA) and its 1974 amendments provided for the following: (1) institution of detailed disclosure requirements for contributions received and monies spent; 36 (2) limitation of individual contributions to $1,000 to
any single candidate per election with an overall limitation of $25,000 per year

by any contributor; 37 (3) limitation of contributions by political committees
other than principal campaign committees to amounts not exceeding $5,000;38

(4) limitation of independent expenditures by individuals and groups made "rel-

ative to a clearly identified candidate"; 39 and (5) establishment of campaign ex-

penditure ceilings for all candidates regardless of whether they used the public
financing program. 4°
B.

ConstitutionalChallenges to Campaign Reform Legislation
In 1976, the constitutionality of the FECA provisions was challenged in

Buckley v. Valeo.4 1 Specifically, the Buckley Court considered the first amendment problems raised by the various campaign reform provisions. 42 As for the
contribution disclosure requirements in FECA, the Court recognized that these
"can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the

First Amendment" 4 3 because knowledge that there will be compelled disclosure
may inhibit the contributor's desire to exercise associational rights through
political contributions. The Court, however, decided to uphold these requirements because they served two important interests. First, with knowledge of
who is giving financial support to a candidate's campaign, voters can more fully
evaluate the candidate and can identify the interests to which the candidate will
be most responsive. 44 Second, the disclosure requirements deter corruption "by
35. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. at 567 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9006 (1982)).
The Act was also significant because it made it a crime for any "political committee" to expend more
than $1,000 in the aggregate "to further the election" of a candidate accepting public financing of his
campaign. Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f)(1) (1982) and declared unconstitutional in Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985)). "The term 'political
committee' means any committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which
accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local public office."
Id. (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9002(9) (1982)).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 304, 86 Stat. at 14 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1982)).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. at 1263, repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 459, 496 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1), (3) (1982)).
38. Id., repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 459, 496
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(2) (1982)).
39. Id. at 1265. Individual contributions are funds sent directly by a person or group to the
candidate or her campaign committee to be spent as the candidate or her committee see fit. Independent expenditures differ in that these are monies that are not contributed to the candidate, but
rather are spent directly and independently by the individual or group on behalf of the candidate to
further her campaign.
40. Id. at 1264.
41. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment concerns raised by campaign finance legislation.
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
44. Id. at 66-67.
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exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity."'4 5
Addressing the amount limits on individual contributions, the Court held
that although these limits restricted the quantity of political expression, they
were constitutionally permissible because they were necessary to further the
state's interest in combating "quid pro quo" corruption of political officeholders. 46 The Court did not, however, view the limits on independent expenditures
made by an individual on behalf of a candidate as having the same inhibiting
effect on corruption, and held that in the absence of such a compelling state
interest the ceilings on independent expenditures were constitutionally infirm.4 7
The Buckley Court also struck down limitations placed on the amount the
candidate or his family could personally contribute to his own campaign. The
Court stated that these limitations "impose[d] a substantial restraint on the ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression." '48 The interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of the candidates, the Court
declared, was "clearly not sufficient to justify the provision's infringement of
fundamental First Amendment rights."' 49 In addition, the Buckley Court held
that while it was lawful to impose total expenditure limits on candidates accepting public funds,50 those provisions that placed ceilings on candidates who
chose not to receive public financing were "substantial and direct restrictions on
the ability of candidates... to engage in protected political expression." 5' The
Court held that there was no governmental interest sufficient to justify these
impediments to free speech and, therefore, that the expenditure limitations vio52
lated the first amendment.
Subsequently, in 1985 the Court in FederalElection Commission v. National
ConservativePAC 5 3 declared unconstitutional those portions of the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971 that limited independent expenditures by
political action committees (PACs) on behalf of candidates receiving public financing.5 4 The results in Buckley and National Conservative PAC are alarming
because they permit unlimited campaign expenditures by wealthy candidates not
using public funds as well as allow these candidates to make use of their personal
45. Id. at 67 (citing S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5587, 5588).

46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
47. Id. at 47-48, 51.
48. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 54. For a discussion of the use of personal wealth in financing political campaigns,
see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65, 108.
51. Id. at 58-59.
52. Id. at 55. The Court stated that unlike the contribution limitations, the total expenditure
limits did nothing to "alleviat[e] the corrupting influence of large contributions." Id. The Court
also held that the ancillary interests "in equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing
for federal office" and in "reducing the allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns" through
the spending ceilings were not sufficient to justify the constitutional harm. Id. at 56-57. But see
Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y.) (upholding
expenditure limitations on those accepting public funding precisely because they reduce quidproquo
corruption), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
53. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
54. Id. at 500-01 (holding 26 U.S.C. 9012(f) (1982) to be unconstitutional).
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and family wealth, without restriction, to finance their own campaigns. These
decisions also allow special interest PACs to make unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates, thereby increasing the likelihood of
influence peddling by such groups.
C. State Legislation
In addition to the federal legislative efforts, the states have been active in
establishing systems of campaign finance reform. 5" Even though states have
long required campaign financing disclosures,5 6 a renewed interest in state campaign reform developed in the early 1970s. During this decade almost every
state made significant changes in its election laws. 57 Although there is a noticeable lack of uniformity in the approaches followed by the states in their reform
efforts, there is some similarity in the methods used.5 8 In general, state legislatures have employed five basic legislative tools: disclosure requirements; contribution limits; contribution restrictions on business, labor, political action
committees (PACs), banks, and savings and loan institutions; bipartisan election
commissions; and public financing for campaigns.5 9
Statutes mandating disclosure of contributions and expenditures now exist
in some form in all fifty states. 60 These requirements are similar from state to
state, the primary difference being the threshold amount at which disclosure
becomes necessary. 6 1 Twenty-seven states have established individual campaign
contribution limits with ceilings varying widely depending on the state office
being sought. 62 Sixteen states limit contributions from corporate entities and
another twenty prohibit corporate contributions altogether. 63 Similarly, eighteen states have established ceilings for union contributions and ten states do not
permit unions to give any money to candidates. 64 Twenty-two states limit the
amount that PACs may contribute to candidates. 65 Banks and savings and loan
55. In the 1890s many states passed laws requiring candidates for state office and their political
committees to disclose contribution amounts and their sources as well as recording campaign expenditures and identifying the recipients of these funds. United States v. International Union of
United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1957) (discussing history of campaign reform legislation). As the Supreme Court once stated, "The theory behind these laws was that the spotlight of
publicity would discourage corporations from making political contributions and would thereby end
their control over party policies." Id. at 571. These publicity laws for the most part "either became
dead letters or were found to be futile," id., and more effective legislation became necessary.
56. See supra note 55.
57. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163.

58. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163.
59. See generally H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163-82 (discussing techniques employed in
state campaign reform efforts).
60. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163.
61. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 163-64. For example, Alabama requires itemized disclosure of all contributions in excess of $10. ALA. CODE § 17-22-10 (1975). In Louisiana, however, the
reporting threshold for major office candidates is $500. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1495.4(C)(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1989).
62. J. PALMER & E. FEIGENBAUM, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 88 Chart 2-A (1988) (published
by the Federal Election Commission).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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institutions are prohibited from making campaign contributions in twenty-one
states and are subject to amount restrictions in another fourteen. 6 6 In addition,

bipartisan election committees have been created by statute in at least thirty

states. 67 In most states commission members are appointed by the governor and
68
function as politically independent overseers of the election process.
State public funding of election campaigns is available now in twenty-two
states, including North Carolina. 6 9 These funds are distributed either to political parties or individual candidates. 70 The two methods of collecting funds that
are used most prevalently are tax checkoffs and tax surcharges. 7 1 The tax

checkoff system, which neither increases tax liability nor decreases the amount
of any refund, enables taxpayers, on their tax returns, to designate that money
from their taxes, usually one dollar for a single filer and two dollars for a joint
return, be put in a public campaign fund.7 2 The tax surcharge method, on the
other hand, increases tax liability by one or two dollars and the taxpayer is gen-

erally permitted to indicate which political party is to receive her money. 73
Three states that provide public funding-Florida, Maryland, and Indiana-use
neither the tax checkoff nor tax surcharge method. Florida and Maryland subsi74
dize candidates directly with money from the states' general revenue accounts.
Indiana, on the other hand, has instituted a unique approach by providing fund-

ing from monies collected from the fees paid for personalized license plates. 75
III.
A.

NORTH CAROLINA'S NEW CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE ACT

PriorNorth CarolinaReforms

A noteworthy early legislative effort in North Carolina was the Corrupt
Practices Act of 1931.76 This Act required an itemized statement of contribu-

tions and expenditures, 7 7 established contribution and expenditure limits in primary elections, 78

and prohibited corporations

from making campaign

66. Id.
67. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 171.
68. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 171.
69. J. PALMER & E. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 62, at chart 4.
70. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 174.
71. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 173. 19 of the states providing public funding employ one
of these two methods of raising the necessary funds. J. PALMER & E. FEIGENBAUM, supra note 62,
at chart 4.
72. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 173-74. The average participation rate among taxpayers
in states using the checkoff system is 20%. Id. at 174.
73. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 174. Taxpayer participation in states with a tax surcharge
system is considerably lower than in states with the checkoff method, id. at 176, probably because
the surcharge method increases tax liablity.
74. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.32 (West Supp. 1989); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 33, § 31-4
(1983).
75. IND. CODE ANN. § 9-7-5.5-8(a)(1) (Burns 1987).
76. Act of May 4, 1931, ch. 348, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 438. See generally Note, A Survey of
Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1931, 9 N.C.L. REV. 347, 371-73 (1931) (discussing the
provisions of the Act).
77. Act of May 4, 1931, ch. 348, § 7, 1931 N.C. Sess. Laws 438, 440.
78. Id. § 9(9).
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contributions. 79 The 1931 Act was later replaced by the Campaign Financial
Regulation Act, which became effective in 1974,80 the chief provisions of which
also dealt with financial disclosure and contribution restrictions. 8' Also of importance was the Campaign Election Fund Act of 1975,82 which marked North
83
Carolina's first attempt at state funding for political campaigns.
B.

The New Campaign Expenditure and Public FinancingAct

It was out of this legislative background that the new North Carolina campaign finance reform statute arose. 84 The initial bill8 s was introduced in the
House of Representatives by Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr. in May 1987,86
and, after extensive amendment, was ratified by the general assembly in July
1988.87

Section 163-278.46 of the Campaign Expenditure Act 8 8 states that a North
Carolina Candidates Financing Fund is to be created and administered by the
State Board of Elections. Money for the fund will be contributed by taxpayers
through a new section on the state income tax return form.8 9 Taxpayers to
79. Id. § 9(15).
80. Act of April 11, 1974, ch. 1272, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 438, 438-50 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.6 to -278.35 (1987)).
81. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13(a) (1987) (limiting amount any individual or political
committee may contribute to candidate in a single election to $4,000).
82. Ch. 775, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1099 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (1985)).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-159.1 (1985) creates a tax checkoff system to finance the North
Carolina Political Parties Financing Fund, which provides money on a pro rata basis to state political parties. In order for a party to be eligible to receive funding it must have recieved at least 10%
of the vote cast for governor in the last preceding state general election. Id. at § 105-159.1(a).
The funds collected are distributed on a pro rata basis to the eligible parties according to their
respective party voter registration totals within the state. Id. No political party with less than I% of
the total number of registered voters in the state is allowed to receive money from the fund. Id.
84. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 163-278.46 to -278.57).
85. H.B. 1124, Reg. Sess. (1987).
86. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 435-36 (1st Sess. 1987).
87. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 205 (2nd Sess. 1987). The most important of these amendments was to remove entirely the

sections of the bill that provided for public financing of campaigns for state senate and house of
representatives and to delete the relevant expenditure limits attached to these provisions. Senate
Committee on Election Laws, Committee Meeting Minutes of June 30, 1988 (1988) (on file at Legislative Office Building, Raleigh, North Carolina). Concern that there would be inequities in financial
remuneration among candidates running in different districts due to the variance in campaign costs
in each district appears to be one reason that the provisions for financing legislative candidates were
struck. Id. In addition, it was felt that any attempt to establish a formula for each district would be
inappropriate at this time since substantial redistricting is scheduled to take place in 1991 following
the decennial census in 1990. (Telephone interview with Donald Kemp of Common Cause (Feb. 22,
1989)). Other important changes included the following: (1) further reduction of the expenditure
limits for candidates for Governor and Council of State who received public funds; (2) removal of
special limitations on the amount a candidate could raise from PACs and himself or his family to
qualify for matching funds; and (3) stiffening of civil and criminal penalties for misuse of public
campaign funds. Senate Committee on Election Laws, Committee Meeting Minutes of June 30,
1988.
88. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 466 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.46).
89. Id. § 2, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 470 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-163.16(f)).
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whom the state owes refunds may voluntarily contribute all or part of their refund to the candidates fund. 90 Any contribution made pursuant to this statute
qualifies as a tax deduction under state law.91 The taxpayer cannot earmark his
contribution for a particular candidate, however.
Section 163-278.47(a) and (c) 92 sets forth the eligibility requirements to obtain public financing. The candidate must file an application by June 15 of the
election year. In addition, the candidate must have opposition on the ballot in
the general election, must agree to abide by the expenditure limitations stated in
section 163-278.48, 93 must raise qualifying matching contributions equal to five
percent of the expenditure limit, and must submit to a post-election audit of the
campaign account.
Section 163-278.4894 establishes campaign expenditure limits for candidates
applying for and receiving public funding. One justification for these limits, limits which the Buckley Court held constitutional,9" is to prevent wealthy candidates from using public funds as a base from which to spend even higher sums. 9 6
The expenditure limit for gubernatorial candidates set forth in section 163278.48 is equal to one dollar multiplied by the number of votes for governor in
the last general election in which there was more than one candidate for governor. For Council of State offices other than governor, the limit is fifty cents
multiplied by the number of votes for governor. Based on previous voting
figures, this would place the limit at approximately $2,174,000 per gubernatorial
candidate, 97 well below the nearly $5 million spent by each candidate in the
1988 election. 98 The spending limit for those seeking Council of State offices
would be approximately $1,087,000 per candidate. 9 9
Section 163-278.50(a)-(b)1 ° ° governs the distribution of funds. A candidate
receiving money from the candidates' fund will be entitled to matching (dollarfor-dollar) funds for qualifying contributions that she has received privately
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 466-67 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.47(a),(c)).
93. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
94. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 467 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.48).
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65, 108 (1976).
96. See Note, Federal Campaign Finance Laws and the First Amendment: Federal Election
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 409,
412-13 n.19 (1986).
97. The total number of votes cast in the 1988 general election for governor was 2,174,149.
Durham Sun, Nov. 9, 1988, at C4, col. 1. At $1 per vote the limit would be approximately
$2,174,000 per candidate for governor.
98. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
99. Using the voting figures in note 97, the 2,174,149 votes multiplied by $ .50 per vote equals
approximately $1,087,000. The initial house bill actually provided for much higher total expenditure
limits. H. B. 1124, Reg. Sess. (1987). The bill, as given to the Senate, called for respective limits of
$2.00 and $1.50 multiplied by the number of votes cast for governor. Id. Using these numbers, each
candidate for governor and Council of State would have been entitled to spend up to approximately
$4.35 million and $3.26 million respectively.
100. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 467 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.50(a)-(b)).
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from political committees or individuals. 10' The maximum amount that a candidate can receive in public matching funds, however, is limited to one-half the
expenditure limits set forth in section 163-278.48.102 For example, using the
estimated limits calculated above, each candidate for Governor and Council of
State would receive up to one-half of these estimated limits-a maximum of
$1,087,000 and $543,500 respectively. The actual amount received will, of
course, depend on the amount of matching private contributions raised. Section
163-278.50(c) controls reporting requirements for those seeking public funding.10 3 Candidates must file itemized reports of contributions and expenditures
with the Board of Elections in August and September before the general
election. 104
Section 163-278.52105 establishes the civil penalties for falsely reporting
matching private contributions or for exceeding the statutory spending limits.
The offending candidate will be fined an amount equal to the amount at issue
with an additional penalty of ten percent of that amount.
Section 163-278.53 106 sets forth the criminal penalties for violations of the
Act. These penalties can be imposed on "[a]ny individual, person, candidate,
political committee, or treasurer who willfully and intentionally violates any of
the provisions of this Article."10 7 All offenders will be guilty of a Class J felony,
punishable by up to three years imprisonment, or a fine, or both.'0 8
Section 163-278.54 mandates that the candidate keep a complete record of
money received from the candidates fund and all subsequent expenditures and
that an itemized report be filed sixty days after the general election.' 0 9 This
section further provides that the State Board of Elections conduct an audit of the
sixty-day report to ensure that the candidate has complied fully with all requirements.110 Section 163-278.55111 requires that all monies received from the candidates fund still unspent ninety days after the election are to be returned to the
candidates fund. Because some legislators in the general assembly questioned
whether the funding system would be supported by the state's taxpayers, the
legislation was enacted on a trial basis. 1 2 Accordingly, the Act requires the
101. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.50(b)).
102. Id. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
103. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 467-68 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.50(c)).

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id., § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 469 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.52).
Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.53).
Id.

108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1(a)(10) (1986)_

109. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 469-70 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.54(a)-(b)).

110. Id., § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws at 470 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.54(c)).
111. Id. (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.55).
112. Senate Committee on Election Laws, Committee Meeting Minutes of June 30, 1988. Existing provisions in North Carolina for funding political parties through an income tax checkoff
system, see supra note 83, have not had much support. H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, PUBLIC
FINANCING OF STATE ELECTIONS: A DATA BOOK AND ELECTION GUIDE TO PUBLIC FUNDING
OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN SEVENTEEN STATES 179 (1982). The participation

rate has averaged only about 7% of all North Carolina taxpayers. Id. During the first five years the
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Board of Elections to prepare a report for the general assembly concerning the
growth of the candidates fund by May 15, 1991.113 The general assembly will
determine at that time if sufficient money has accumulated in the fund to warrant proceeding with the campaign financing provisions of the Act. If the
amount available is insufficient to proceed, the money in the fund will be trans11 4
ferred to the state's general revenue fund.
IV.

GOALS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Campaign reform statutes such as North Carolina's new Act are directed at
achieving a number of important goals. In particular, these statutory efforts
seek to: 1) diminish the potential for corruption in political office; 2) minimize
the appearance of corruption and impropriety; 3) reduce the advantages of the
wealthy and thereby democratize the electoral process; 4) increase political participation at all levels; and 5) improve the quality of the election process by
changing campaigns from media contests to competitions of ideas.' 15
Providing candidates with the alternative of public funding can reduce substantially their need to engage in the solicitation of private contributions from
individuals and PACs. As a result, it is possible to "minimiz[e] the influence of
money as a quid pro quo for certain action by a politician."lt 6 This diminishes
manipulation or "undue influence" 1 7 by well-financed outside sources and, in
turn, reduces political corruption. Even if the actual effect on political corruption is indeterminable, public funding, when combined with limits on the size of
private contributions and strict financial disclosure requirements-a combination that now exists in North Carolina' 8 -will, at the very least, combat the
appearance of corruption and impropriety and thereby increase waning public
confidence in the electoral process." 19
Another important function of public funding is that it reduces the advantage held by wealthy candidates. It provides less wealthy opponents, who previously may have been discouraged from running for office for purely financial
20
reasons, with an increased level of monetary support for their campaigns.'
Reducing the wealthy candidates' advantage results in two important benefits.
political party fund was in operation, the largest total annual amount checked off for the fund by the
taxpayers was $259,689. Id. at 191.
113. Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 4, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 471.
114. Id.
115. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 741-46 (discussing objectives of campaign reform
legislation).
116. Moore & La Belle, Public FinancingOf Elections: New Proposals To Meet New Obstacles,
13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 863, 883 (1985).
117. Nicholson, supra note 20, 625-30 (discussing problem of undue influence in the political
process and available measures for preventing it).
118. E.g., Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sass. LAws 466, 466 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-276.46) (providing for public funding of governor and Council of State
candidates); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13 (1987) (placing limits on the dollar amount of campaign
contributions); Id. § 163-278.8 (1987) (requiring detailed disclosure of contributions received and
expenditures made).
119. See Note, supra note 2, at 741-43.
120. See Note, supra note 2, at 743-44.
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First, it democratizes the electoral process and our government by making it
more representative of the various interests and groups in our society. Public
funding ensures that candidates from all stations of life will have the opportunity
to run for public office and that these positions of power will not be filled by only
the wealthier classes.1 2 1 Second, after reducing the advantage of the wealthy,
election victories will perhaps turn less on financial status and more on competence. Public funding should increase the number of able candidates for public
office and increase the likelihood that the most qualified, not merely the most
affluent, candidates will fill these important positions.
Diminishing the influence of wealth on the outcome of elections will raise
not only political participation at the candidate level, but also should have a
similar impact at the grassroots level as well. Opening the electoral process to
all candidates and not merely those best able to finance their campaigns should
help alleviate "the increasing cynicism and alienation of the general public" that
has caused voter turnout to plummet.1 22 Moreover, an additional benefit of the
expenditure limits imposed on those accepting public funding is that they create
an economic incentive to use more volunteers at the grassroots campaign level,
23
further increasing interest and participation in the electoral process. 1
Finally, the campaign reform statutes are designed to improve the quality
of political campaigning and to change the character of the electoral process
from a personal media contest to a competition of ideas.' 24 With expenditure
limits placed on those candidates who receive public funding, campaign budgets
will have to be streamlined. A logical result of such budget trimming is that
mass media blitz campaigns no longer will be possible at the level of recent campaigns. With this reduction in the quantity of mass media advertising, the quality of campaign messages should increase as candidates spend available media
funds on only the most important and substantive issues involved.125 Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Buckley struck down spending limits on candidates
not accepting public funds because the Court believed these limits "restrict[ed]
the number of issues discussed, [and] the depth of their exploration."' 126 This is
121. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 25-29 (discussing connection between wealth and
success in obtaining political office). On the federal level, in 1983 23 senators and 19 representatives
had assets in excess of $1 million. Id. at 28. In the 1978 congressional elections, a total of 58
candidates personally contributed or loaned at least $100,000 to their own election campaigns. Id. at
27. In 1982, one candidate spent $6.9 million from personal funds in his campaign. Id. Large sums
have also been spent in pursuit of state offices. For example, Governor John D. Rockefeller, IV of
West Virginia spent over $11.5 million of his own money in a reelection bid in 1980. Id. In the 1988
governor's race in North Carolina, Democratic candidate Bob Jordan made a loan of $300,000 from
his own funds to his campaign to buy television time during the last week before the election. The
Durham Sun, Nov. 1, 1988, at A3, col. 2.
122. Note, supra note 2, at 746 (citing Packwood, Campaign Finance, Communication and the
First Amendment, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 783-84 (1983)).
123. Girard, Campaign Finance Reform in California, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 567, 595-96
(1983).
124. See Note, supra note 2, at 744-45.
125. Friedlander, Louis & Laufer, The New York City Campaign Finance Act, 16 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 345, 350 (1988) ("candidates bound by expenditure limits are compelled to adopt a more
efficient, economical, and quality-conscious approach to campaigning") (emphasis added).
126. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
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not necessarily the case, however. As one commentator observed,
In actual practice, the amount of money spent may determine the
quantity of speech, but it bears no relationship to the depth or quality

of the discussion. In fact, the effect may be precisely the inverse; as
more money becomes available,1 27media advertisements tend to become
"slicker" and more superficial.
In addition, by substituting public for private funding, the reforms will reduce
the need of the candidates to engage in private fundraising. The "'great drain
on [the candidates'] time and energies' required by fundraising"' 128 will be rebetter use
duced, and the candidates may put this additional free time to much
29

by "providing competitive debate of the issues for the electorate."'1
V.

CAMPAIGN REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA:
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT?

IS

THERE

With the addition of the new Campaign Expenditure Act, North Carolina

now has a comprehensive system for regulating the most significant problems in
political campaigning. This system consists of a combination of legislation that
requires detailed disclosure of contributions received and expenditures made,
establishes limits on the dollar amount of contributions from individuals and
PACs, and provides public financing for candidates for the state's highest offices.13 0 One shortcoming that should be addressed is the Act's failure to extend
the public financing provisions and expenditure limits to general assembly candidates. This omission is significant because the costs of state legislative cam131

paigns have in recent years increased more rapidly than other types of races

and because there has been a general pattern of winning candidates outspending

their losing rivals.' 3 2 A practical reason, however, for not extending the financ127. Note, supra note 2, at 744-45. The concern here is that higher spending may actually produce "negative" campaigning, "anticandidate assaults that lower the quality of political debate and
increase the disillusionment of voters." Id. at 745.
128. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprintedin 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5587, 5591-92).
129. Id.
130. E.g., Act of July 7, 1988, ch. 1063, § 1, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 466 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-276.46 (providing for public funding of governor and Council of State candidates); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13 (1987) (placing limits on the dollar amount of campaign
contributions); id. § 163-278.8 (requiring detailed disclosure of contributions received and expenditures made).
131. Jones, FinancingState Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FiNANCING ELECTIONS IN THE 1980s 172, 174 (M. Malbin ed. 1984). For example, the cost of legislative campaigns in California in 1980 increased by 71% over the costs in the 1978 election year. This
jump occurred despite an increase of 1,248% and 1,427% respectively for state senate and house
seats between 1958 and 1978. Id.
132. Id. at 177. One must be careful, however, to avoid assuming that large expenditures are
always necessarily harmful and undesirable. To the extent that large expenditures reflect broadbased, political-financial support of a large number of constituents, they are perfectly consistent with
our representative form of democratic government. Moreover, large expenditures are beneficial to
the electoral process because they can be used to increase the quantity of campaign information
reaching the electorate about the candidates and important issues. As one commentator has reasoned, "[c]ampaign spending ... should be considered the tuition the American people must spend
for their education on the issues." H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 196.
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ing provisions to legislative candidates at this time is that any formula for distributing funds among the different districts would be upset by the redistricting
plans scheduled for 199 1.133 Once the redistricting takes place, this deficiency in
the statutory scheme should be remedied.
This aside, the North Carolina campaign reform legislation appears to go as
far as the United States Supreme Court will currently permit. Because of the
important Supreme Court decisions in Buckley v. Valeo 134 and FederalElection
Commission v. NationalConservativePA C,135 state legislatures are unable constitutionally to address the remaining problems of rising campaign expenditures by
candidates not accepting public funding, the unlimited use of personal finances
by wealthy candidates, and the large independent expenditures made on a candidate's behalf by well-financed, special-interest PACs. A brief examination of the
Court's decision not to permit legislation directed at combating these problems
is instructive in determining the limits of future reform.
136
The 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
established total expenditure limits for campaigns by all candidates for the offices of President, Vice President, Senator, and Representative regardless of
whether they accepted public funding. 137 The Supreme Court in Buckley struck
down these restrictions because they limited the quantity of the candidates'
political expression without serving a compelling state interest. 13 8 Specifically,
the Court held that these limitations did nothing to combat quidpro quo corruption, since this problem was addressed by FECA's disclosure and contribution
limitation provisions. 139 Two other potential state interests were recognized in
Buckley: equalizing financial resources of candidates and reducing the rapidly
increasing costs of political campaigns.140 The Court, however, found neither of
these interests sufficient to justify the expenditure ceilings. 141
There is some basis for challenging the continuing validity of the Buckley
Court's holding on this issue. In Republican National Committee v. Federal
Election Commission 142 a federal district court faced a challenge to the total
expenditure ceilings placed on candidates accepting public funding under the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. 143 The district court found no first
amendment violation here because the Fund Act merely provided a candidate
with "an additional funding alternative which he or she would not otherwise
have."' 144 The district court went further, however, stating that even if there
133. See supra note 87.
134. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discussed supra at notes 41-52 and accompanying text).
135. 470 U.S 480 (1985) (discussed supra at notes 53-54 and accompanying text).
136. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1264, repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 459, 496.
137. Id.
138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 56-57.
141. Id.
142. 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
143. Id. at 282-83.
144. Id. at 285 (emphasis removed).
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was an infringement of first amendment rights, "the burden attributable to the
[expenditure] limits imposed ...

is fully justified by the compelling state inter-

ests." 145 The "compelling state interests" were to reduce the time required for
fundraising, thus leaving candidates more time to engage in competitive debate, 14 6 and to avoid creating "unhealthy" quidproquo obligations between candidates and their private contributors. 147 What is interesting is that the
compelling interest argument accepted by the district court in Republican National Committee, which ties expenditure limits to a reduction in quid pro quo
corruption, was specifically rejected by the Buckley Court which held that expenditure limitations played no role in reducing corruption.1 48 Despite this
inconsistency, Republican National Committee, on appeal, was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.1 49 From this one may infer that there has been a
change in attitude regarding the state interest in overall expenditure limits.
The question remains whether these ceilings would necessarily improve the
electoral system if placed on all candidates regardless of whether they accept
public funds. The advantages of such limits, simply stated, are that they may
improve the quality of campaign messages, 150 reduce fundraising burdens, prevent gross disparities in spending among candidates,15 1 and reduce the potential
t5 2
for corruption by limiting the incentive to get around contribution limits.
The disadvantages of expenditure limits are that they often hurt challengers who
usually must spend more to overcome the advantage of the better-known incumbent opponents. 153 In addition, "expenditure limits [on candidates] tend to trigger independent expenditures [by private third parties] and thus to diminish
accountability for the uses of campaign money."'15 4 There are also difficulties in
establishing limits among legislative candidates, given the variance in the cost of
campaigning from district to district.15 5
Large expenditures, when properly used, can also perform an educative
function.1 56 As greater amounts are spent, more information concerning the
qualifications of the candidates should reach the electorate. Moreover, if contribution limits are in place preventing large contributions by any single individual
or group, a candidate's ability to raise large numbers of smaller contributions to
145. Id.
146. Id. at 284.
147. Id. at 285.
148. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56.
149. 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
150. See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
151. Girard, supra note 123, at 595.
152. Girard, supra note 123, at 595 n.2.
153. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 189.
154. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 189. Dr. Alexander uses the 1980 presidential election to
illustrate this point. Id. at 124-30, 189. In the general election, both candidates accepted statutory
public funding. Id. at 124. As a condition to these monies, both candidates were, under federal law,
limited to spending the amount received in public financing and were prohibited from accepting any
private contributions. Id. The limits imposed on the candidates sparked third party independent
spending which cannot be legally limited under Buckley. Independent expenditures on behalf of
President Reagan totalled $10.6 million. Id. at 125.
155. See supra note 87.
156. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 196.
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boost her campaign expenditures may not be undesirable. It may merely reflect
pluralistic support by a large number of voters. Such an expression of support is
entirely consistent with our system of representative democracy and our recognition of the sanctity of first amendment political expression. In short, what is
needed is further empirical study at the state level of the large amounts of money
being spent by candidates to determine if total expenditure limits would still
serve compelling state interests.
Although evidence appears to exist concerning the inequitable influence of a
candidate's personal wealth on political success, 157 enough perhaps to change
the Supreme Court's mind on the constitutional validity of restrictions on a candidate's personal contributions to his own campaign, the same cannot be said
definitively of independent expenditures by PACs. Commentators in the area of
campaign finance reform differ on the effect of PAC expenditures. Some observers have concluded that these independent expenditures by well-financed PACs
result in a disproportionate influence on the decisions of political officeholders. 158 Others argue that the influence of PACs may be overstated 59 and that
PACs may actually have a positive influence by increasing dissemination of information to the voters 160 and by ensuring democratic representation of the
competing interests in society. As with proposals for expenditure limits, additional state election research on the influence of PACs is needed before this controversy can be resolved. 1 6 1 Unfortunately, at this time, when research and
further study are needed most, the ability to conduct such studies is being diminished in state after state by budget and personnel cuts in the state agencies cre162
ated to collect and monitor data on the campaign process.
The new North Carolina Campaign Expenditure Act, when combined with
existing campaign reform statutes, provides an impressive system for reducing
the potential for political corruption and for giving less wealthy candidates a
greater opportunity to compete for political office. Although further reform
may be necessary in the areas of expenditure limitations, ceilings on personal
contributions from wealthy candidates to their own campaigns, and limits on the
independendent expenditures of PACs, the North Carolina legislative efforts go
as far as the United States Supreme Court currently allows. This should not,
however, mark the end of campaign and electoral reform efforts in North Carolina, but should rather mark a starting point for further reform. As a first step,
adequate funding and political support should be provided to ensure that remaining problems will be studied thoroughly. Such study is important because
persuading the Supreme Court that further reform is both necessary and constitutional, particularly in the three areas noted above, will require careful docu157. See supra note 121. Use of personal or family wealth to boost campaign expenditures
clearly does not reflect broad-based, political-financial support.
158. Jones, supra note 131, at 187.
159. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 101.
160. Latus, Assessing IdeologicalPA Cs: From Outrage to Understanding,in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN THE

161. See Jones, supra note 131, at 187.
162. Jones, supra note 131, at 209-10.

1980s 142, 167 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
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mentation of the compelling state interests in further regulation. Once
compelling interests can be established, the general assembly should move forward and experiment with additional campaign reform measures even if such
measures will likely provoke renewed constitutional debate on this issue. As
Justice Brandeis once stated, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."1 63 North Carolina, as a state with a comprehensive campaign regulation system in place and the political leadership to direct further reform efforts, is particularly well-suited to become such a laboratory.
JAMES DEMAREST SECOR,

163. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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